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Abstract  
When aiming to improve another person’s long-term well-being, people may choose to 
induce that person to experience a negative emotion in the short term. We labelled this form 
of agent–target interpersonal emotion regulation altruistic affect worsening and hypothesized 
that it may happen when three conditions are met: (1) The agents experience empathic 
concern for the target of the affect-worsening process; (2) the negative emotion to be induced 
helps the target achieve a goal (anger for confrontation or fear for avoidance); and (3) there is 
no benefit for the agent. This hypothesis was tested by manipulating perspective taking 
instructions and the goal to be achieved whilst participants (N = 140) played a computer 
video game with different goals. Participants following other-oriented perspective taking 
instructions decided to induce more anger or fear in a supposed fellow participant working to 
achieve a confrontational or avoidance goal, respectively.  
Keywords: altruistic affect worsening; interpersonal emotion regulation; goal; 
perspective taking; emotion.  
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Cruel to Be Kind: Factors Underlying Altruistic Interpersonal Affect Worsening  
Sometimes people cause a loved one to experience a negative emotional state if they 
think that this will increase that other person’s (long-term) well-being. But why would feeling 
bad be beneficial? According to an instrumental approach to emotion regulation, people may 
choose to feel a positive or negative emotion in the short term if doing so maximizes the 
attainment of a specific long-term goal (Erber & Erber, 2000; Tamir, 2009; Tamir & Ford, 
2009). For example, people may choose to feel anger when pursuing confrontation goals 
(e.g., dealing with someone who cheated) or fear when pursuing avoidance goals (e.g., 
escaping from a scary situation) because these negative emotions are seen as beneficial for 
achieving these specific goals (Tamir & Ford, 2009; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008).  
Research on the regulation of others’ emotions (i.e., interpersonal emotion regulation; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007) has for a long time followed a hedonic approach that suggests 
people may attempt to decrease others’ negative emotions if those emotions are perceived as 
harmful for the others (Zaki & Williams, 2013). However, people may also engage in 
instrumental affect worsening when regulating others’ emotions: An agent may choose to 
make a target feel bad (1) if this negative emotion allows the target to achieve a goal and (2) 
if the agent him- or herself can benefit from this interpersonal emotion regulation by 
obtaining a desirable outcome (Netzer, Van Kleef, & Tamir, 2015). In this case, instrumental 
interpersonal affect worsening would be purely egoistically motivated. But would people 
choose to change others’ emotions for altruistic reasons? Or, put differently, would an agent 
make others feel bad in the short term if this negative affect entails a benefit solely for the 
target of the regulation process and not for the agent him- or herself? The aim of this study 
was to investigate conditions for such altruistic affect worsening.  
  We suggest that three conditions must be met for altruistic affect worsening to 
happen. First, the agent’s motivation has to be altruistic, that is, the final aim of the agent’s 
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action is to increase the target’s well-being rather than to obtain a personal benefit or goal, 
according to the classic definition of altruistic motivation (Batson, 2011). Second, the agent 
must aim to instil a negative emotion in the target that is beneficial for the target’s goal 
pursuit (e.g., making the target feel anger to achieve confrontation goals or fear to achieve 
avoidance goals; Netzer et al., 2015; Tamir & Ford, 2009). In these situations affect 
worsening is seen as a means to an end, not an end itself (Niven, Totterdell, & Holman, 2009; 
Tamir, 2015). Third, altruistic motivation and altruistic affect worsening are more likely 
when the agent empathizes with the target.  
To test these claims we reconciled two different research traditions. First, we drew on 
Batson and colleagues’ (e.g., Batson, 2011) experimental methods to manipulate empathic 
concern through perspective taking instructions. People who received other-oriented 
perspective taking instructions (e.g., “imagine how the other person is feeling in a certain 
situation”) were shown to be more likely to experience empathic concern and to act 
altruistically than people who received objective perspective taking instructions (Batson, 
Early, & Salvarani, 1997).  So far, this line of research has focussed on behaviour alone as a 
means to increase others’ benefits or decrease others’ suffering (e.g., taking electric shocks 
on behalf of another; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). However, it has 
not investigated whether empathic concern leads people to use emotions to benefit others 
(e.g., to help them achieve a specific goal).  Secondly, we relied on Tamir and colleagues’ 
(e.g., Tamir, 2015) procedures to study people’s explicit and implicit emotional preferences 
for others and perceptions of emotion utility. Although this research has shown that people 
may choose to make others feel bad if they themselves benefit (Netzer et al., 2015), it has not 
assessed whether people engage in affect worsening for the sole benefit of another. Thus, we 
sought not only to extend previous research findings by relying on reliable experimental 
designs but also to bridge different traditions to expand current knowledge on interpersonal 
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emotion regulation. This may enhance our understanding of the dynamics of social 
interaction and social cognition by providing further information about adults’ emotion–
outcome expectancies and how they balance (emotional) costs and benefits when regulating 
other people’s emotions.  
 To study altruistic affect worsening, we focussed on the process model of emotion 
regulation (Gross, 2007), which posits that people may change their own and others’ 
emotions by selecting a strategy that influences a particular stage of the emotion process. 
People may change emotions by selecting or modifying a situation (e.g., not going to a party), 
diverting attention (e.g., looking away), changing what they think about the situation (e.g., 
reappraisal), or altering their physiological response (e.g., suppression). We focussed on the 
strategy of situation selection, which involves selecting or avoiding a stimulus or a situation 
in order to experience a specific emotion (Gross, 2007). Previous research (e.g., Netzer et al., 
2015; Tamir et al., 2008) has shown how participants selected different emotion-inducing 
stimuli to change the emotional experience in themselves or others to attain specific goals. 
 We hypothesized that participants would show altruistic affect worsening under the 
conditions outlined above. Specifically, compared to participants in an objective perspective 
taking condition, participants in an other-oriented perspective taking condition should select 
for a target (a) more negative emotional stimuli at the risk of lowering their own chances of 
earning £50 (empathy hypothesis) and (b) negative stimuli consistent with the target’s goal. 
That is, angry emotional stimuli should be chosen in a confrontation goal condition and 
fearful emotional stimuli in an avoidance goal condition (beneficial goal hypothesis). 
Furthermore, participants in an other-oriented perspective taking condition (c) should rate 
their chosen emotional stimuli as more beneficial than the other stimuli in pursuing the 
target’s goals (at their own expense; altruistic motivation hypothesis).  
Method 
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Participants  
One hundred and forty adults (86 women, 54 men; Mage = 30.85 years, SD = 13.68; 
age range: 18–71 years) were recruited from a paid pool at the authors’ institution and 
completed the study in exchange for payment (£4/$6). An a priori power analysis showed that 
35 participants per condition should have 80% power to detect an effect size (f) of 0.50. 
Design 
A 2 × 2 between-subjects design was employed with the two independent factors 
perspective taking (other-oriented, objective) and goal (confrontation, avoidance). 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions: (1) other-oriented perspective 
taking/confrontation; (2) objective perspective taking/confrontation; (3) other-oriented 
perspective taking/avoidance; (4) objective perspective taking/avoidance.  
Procedure 
The study was presented as an examination of performance in one of two computer-
based video games. Participants were tested in groups of four. Closeness between participants 
was controlled by making sure participants did not know each other. Each participant 
completed the study in a separate cubicle. After signing the consent form, participants rated 
their current mood on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Then, as a cover story, participants were told that they would be paired with another 
anonymous person. If assigned to the role of Player A, they had to write down a personal 
statement so that Player B could get to know them before making choices for them in the 
game. If assigned to the role of Player B, they would receive a personal statement from 
Player A before making choices for him/her in the game. In fact, all participants were 
allocated to the role of Player B.  
Participants were told that prior to reading Player A’s note they would receive 
instructions to make sure they all had a similar emotional experience. Participants in the 
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other-oriented perspective taking condition were asked to imagine how the other player 
would feel in the described scenario, whereas participants in the objective perspective taking 
condition were told to remain detached about the note (see Batson et al., 2007).  As we aimed 
to test whether affect worsening may happen for altruistic reasons and given that an altruistic 
motivation is more likely to happen when empathic concern is experienced (Batson, 2011), 
we decided to include only those manipulations that would most likely isolate the experience 
of empathic concern from the experience of personal distress (i.e., other-oriented vs. 
objective perspective taking instructions; see Batson et al., 1988). Therefore, we decided not 
to include a no-instruction condition because (a) previous research has shown that when not 
given any instructions, people tend to take another’s perspective (see Batson, 2011, for a 
review) and (b) a no-instruction condition can increase both empathic concern and personal 
distress, as these emotions usually co-occur (e.g., Barraza & Zak, 2009). Hence, in a no-
instruction condition participants might experience empathic concern and personal distress 
which might entail both an altruistic and egoistic motivation  (Batson, 2011). 
Next, participants received a sealed envelope with a purported handwritten 
communication from Player A that described Player A’s recent break-up and how upset and 
helpless Player A was feeling about it (taken from Batson et al., 2007), in order to provoke 
empathic concern in the participants. After reading Player A’s note, participants rated how 
they felt towards Player A using the Empathic Response Questionnaire (Batson, Fultz, & 
Schoenrade, 1987). 
In addition, participants were tested in one of two goal-pursuit conditions. They were 
asked to play different games so we could manipulate the goal to be achieved. In the 
confrontation goal condition, the actual participants (as well as the supposed partner) were 
asked to play the game ‘Soldier of Fortune’, a first-person shooter game with a clear 
confrontation goal (i.e., to kill as many enemies as possible; see Netzer et al., 2015; Tamir et 
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al., 2008). In the avoidance goal condition, participants were asked to play the game ‘Escape 
Dead Island’, a first-person game with the goal of avoidance (i.e., escaping from a room 
without being killed by zombies). We chose this game to test fear preference for achieving an 
avoidance goal, as previous literature has extensively linked avoidance behaviour with fear 
(Carver, 2001; Frijda, 1986; Ohman, 1993).  For both games, participants were informed that 
depending on their own individual performance (i.e., number of individuals killed in ‘Soldier 
of Fortune’ and distance travelled in ‘Escape Dead Island’) they would receive a number of 
raffle tickets with the chance to win £50 in Amazon vouchers.  After 5 min, participants were 
asked to stop playing.  
Assessment of dependent variables. Participants were told they had to make several 
choices before their partner could start playing. They were reminded that their choices might 
improve or worsen their partner’s performance. Thus, if they selected stimuli that improved 
the partner’s performance they might lower their chances of receiving £50, whereas if the 
stimuli worsened the partner’s performance their likelihood of getting the prize would be 
higher. Before making their choices, participants were presented with different descriptions 
of the video game and different music clips that targeted specific emotions. For each 
description and for each music clip participants had to rate the extent to which they wanted 
their partner to read the description and listen to the clip before or while playing the game 
(preferences for emotion-inducing stimuli). Then, participants had to rate to what extent they 
wanted their partner to feel angry, fearful, or neutral (explicit emotional preferences).  We 
always asked participants to indicate their preferences for emotion-inducing stimuli before 
their explicit emotional preferences to avoid demand characteristics. Next, participants had to 
rate to what extent they thought anger, fear, or a neutral emotion would be beneficial to 
success in the game (perceived utility of emotions). Finally, participants were fully debriefed.  
Materials  
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Manipulation check 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988) is a 20-item 
questionnaire that assesses participants’ positive (α = .85) and negative affect (α = .84) on a 
5-point Likert scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
The 12-item version of the Empathic Response Questionnaire (Batson et al., 1987) 
was used to assess participants’ levels of empathic concern for and personal distress on behalf 
of Player A on a 7-point Likert scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Empathic concern was 
calculated as the average of the terms warmth, soft-hearted, tenderness, moved, 
compassionate, and sympathetic (α = .88). Personal distress was calculated as the average of 
the terms upset, grief, sorrow, distressed, worried, and anxious (α = .87). 
Dependent variables 
Preferences for emotion-inducing stimuli for the partner. Participants listened to 
two anger-inducing (Refuse/Resist by Appocalytica; Mars from The Planets), two neutral 
(Treefingers by Radiohead; First Thing by Four Tet), and two fear-inducing (The Bon Dam 
by Julyan D; Hand of Fate: theme from the movie Signs) music clips, all used and validated 
by Netzer et al. (2015). Participants were also presented with three short game descriptions 
designed to elicit an angry, fearful, or neutral emotional state (Netzer et al., 2015). The anger-
inducing game description described the main character fighting enemies after they had 
destroyed the character’s village. The fear-inducing game description described the main 
character surrounded by dangerous enemies who want to kill him or her. The neutral game 
description described the main character monitoring his or her surroundings. For each 
description and music clip, participants were required to rate how much they wanted their 
partner to read or listen to it on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Given that the 
correlation between stimuli was high (r = .63, p = .001, anger-inducing stimuli; r = .57, p 
= .001, fear-inducing stimuli; and r = .54, p = .001, neutral stimuli) and that we did not find 
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differences when entering type of stimuli as a within-subject variable in subsequent analyses 
(see supplementary online materials), we averaged the responses to the music clip and game 
description stimuli for each emotion thereby creating an emotion-inducing stimulus 
preference score for each emotion (anger, fear, and neutral).  
Explicit emotional preferences. Participants rated how much they wanted their 
partner to feel neutral, angry, or fearful whilst playing the game on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 
7 (extremely).   
Perceived utility of emotions. Participants rated the extent to which feeling angry, 
neutral, or fearful would be helpful to success in the game on a scale of 1 (not very helpful at 
all) to 7 (extremely helpful).  
Results 
Manipulation check  
 A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with perspective taking (other-
oriented, objective) and goal (confrontation, avoidance) as independent factors and empathic 
concern and personal distress as dependent variables revealed a significant effect of 
perspective taking, F(1, 139) = 13.79, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .09. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition (M= 4.47, SD = 0.15) reported 
significantly higher empathic concern than those in the objective perspective taking condition 
(M = 3.70, SD = 0.14); p = .001. For personal distress, results of a MANOVA did not show a 
significant effect of the perspective taking manipulation, F(1, 139) = 2.91, p = .09, ηp
2
= .02 
(see Table 1 for means).  
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Table 1 
Mean and Standard Deviations of Vicarious Emotions and Emotion Utility by 
Experimental Condition 
Variable Other-oriented perspective Objective perspective 
Confrontation 
goal 
Avoidance 
goal 
Confrontation 
goal 
Avoidance 
goal 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Empathic concern 4.18 (1.21)
a
 4.75 (0.96)
a
 3.62 (1.42)
b
 3.77 (1.29)
b
 
Personal distress 2.20 (1.30)
a
 2.33 (1.02)
a
 1.92 (1.05)
a
 1.99 (0.94)
a
 
Anger utility 5.69 (1.39)
a
 2.66 (1.64)
b
 3.44 (1.59)
b
 3.74 (2.11)
b
 
Fear utility 3.34 (1.92)
b
 6.09 (1.31)
a
 3.31 (1.95)
b
 3.09 (1.99)
b
 
Neutral utility 3.71 (1.91)
a
 2.60 (1.33)
b
 3.42 (1.86)
a
 3.03 (1.12)
a
 
Note. Rows with different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences at p < .05. 
 
A MANOVA with the dependent variables positive and negative affect showed that 
perspective taking, goal, and their interaction were non-significant for positive [perspective 
taking: F(1, 139) = .97, p = .33, ηp
2
= .007; goal: F(1, 139) = .18, p = .67, ηp
2
= .001; 
Perspective Taking × Goal: F(1, 139) = 1.14, p = .29, ηp
2
= .008] and negative affect 
[perspective taking: F(1, 139) = .63, p = .43, ηp
2
= .005; goal: F(1, 139) = .48, p = .49, 
ηp
2
= .003; Perspective Taking × Goal: F(1, 139) = .58, p = .45, ηp
2
= .004]. 
Main analyses 
Explicit emotional preference. Figure 1a shows explicit emotional preferences by 
condition.  
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(a)  
     
          
(b) 
      
  
Figure 1. Mean of (a) explicit emotional preference and (b) preference for emotion-inducing 
stimuli. Error bars display standard errors. 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with perspective taking (other-
oriented, objective) and goal (confrontation, avoidance) as between-subjects variables and 
emotion (anger, fear, and neutral) as within-subject variable produced a significant Emotion × 
Perspective Taking × Goal interaction, F(1, 136) = 54.13, p = .001, ηp
2
= .28. In the 
confrontation goal condition, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition 
reported a higher preference for anger, F(1, 69) = 125.17, p = .001, ηp
2
= .65, than participants 
in the objective perspective taking condition. There were no differences between conditions 
for fear, F(1, 69) = .65, p = .42, ηp
2
= .009, and neutral, F(1, 69) = .41, p = .53, ηp
2
= .006. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the objective perspective taking condition 
did not differ in their ratings of explicit emotional preferences for the different emotions 
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(ps > .09). However, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition reported a 
higher preference for anger compared to fear, d = 3.20, SE = .30, p = .001, and neutral, d = 
2.89, SE = .27, p = .001. In the avoidance goal condition, participants in the other-oriented 
perspective taking condition reported a higher preference for fear, F(1, 69) = 76.62, p = .001, 
ηp
2 
= .53, and less neutral, F(1, 69) = 7.59, p = .01, ηp
2
= .10, than participants in the objective 
perspective taking condition. There were no differences between conditions for anger, F(1, 
69) = .51, p = .48, ηp
2
= .007. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the objective 
perspective taking condition did not differ in their ratings of explicit emotional preferences 
for the different emotions (ps > .08). However, participants in the other-oriented perspective 
taking condition reported a higher preference for fear compared to anger, d = 3.46, SE = .31, 
p = .001, and neutral, d = 3.23, S.E. = .41, p = .001. 
 
Preferences for emotion-inducing stimuli for the partner. Figure 1b shows 
preferences for each emotion-inducing stimulus by experimental condition (descriptions and 
music clips combined; for separate analysis of music clips and game descriptions, please see 
supplementary material). A repeated-measures ANOVA with perspective taking (other-
oriented, objective) and goal (confrontation, avoidance) as between-subjects variables and 
emotion (anger, fear, and neutral) as within-subject variable produced a significant Emotion × 
Perspective Taking × Goal interaction, F(1, 136) = 35.45, p = .001, ηp
2
= .21. In the 
confrontation goal condition, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition 
chose stimuli that were more anger inducing, F(1, 69) = 43.88, p = .001, ηp
2
= .39, less fear-
inducing, F(1, 69) = 4.42, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .06, and less neutral, F(1, 69) = 11.70, p = .001, 
ηp
2
= .15, than participants in the objective perspective taking condition. In the avoidance goal 
condition, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition chose stimuli that 
were more fear inducing, F(1, 69) = 35.38, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .34 and less neutral, F(1, 69) = 
15.34, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .18 than participants in the objective perspective taking condition. 
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There were no differences for anger-inducing stimuli, F(1, 69) = 3.69, p = .06, ηp
2 
= .05  
(Figure 1b). 
Perceived utility of emotions. A repeated-measures ANOVA with perspective taking 
(other-oriented, objective) and goal (confrontation, avoidance) as between-subjects factors 
and emotion (anger, fear, and neutral) as within-subject factor revealed a significant Emotion 
× Perspective Taking × Goal interaction, F(1, 136) = 32.04, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .32. In the 
confrontation goal condition, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition 
perceived anger to be significantly more useful than participants in the objective perspective 
taking condition, F(1, 69) = 39.83, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .37. There were no differences between 
perspective taking conditions for fear, F(1, 69) = 0.01, p = .94, ηp
2 
= .001, or neutral, F(1, 69) 
= 0.44, p = .51, ηp
2 
= .01.  Participants expected anger to be more effective than fear, d = 
2.34, SE = 0.39, p = .001, or neutral, d = 1.97, SE = 0.41, p = .001 (Table 1). In the avoidance 
goal condition, participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition perceived fear 
(F(1, 69) = 55.35, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .45) to be significantly more useful and anger (F(1, 69) = 
5.78, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .08) to be significantly less useful than participants in the objective 
perspective taking condition. There were no differences between perspective taking 
conditions for neutral, F(1, 69) = 2.11, p = .15, ηp
2 
= .03. Participants expected fear to be 
significantly more useful than anger, d = 3.42, SE = 0.39, p = .001 (Table 1). 
Testing Mediation of Explicit Emotion Preferences and Emotion Utility Beliefs. 
Given that participants differed in their perception of emotion utility depending on the 
perspective taking condition, one may argue that participants’ preferences for emotion-
inducing stimuli may be driven by different emotion utility beliefs rather than explicit 
emotion preferences. In other words, rather than by altruistic affect worsening the results may 
additionally be explained by theory of mind, as participants in the other-oriented perspective 
taking condition may actually be better at anticipating what emotion may be more beneficial 
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for the target depending on the goal. To differentiate between these two alternative 
hypotheses, we conducted two moderated mediation analyses (i.e., one for preference of 
anger-inducing stimuli, one for preference for fear-inducing stimuli; see supplemental 
material for the depiction of the models) using the software Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 
2012). Specifically, we investigated whether emotion utility and/or explicit emotion 
preferences were significant mediators of the relationship between perspective taking and 
preferences for emotion-inducing stimuli across different goals (i.e., avoidance and 
confrontation). To formally test the mediation hypotheses, we used a bias-corrected bootstrap 
approach (1000 bootstraps) to create a 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mediated 
path (ab). This method was used as it has more power to detect mediation effects (Hayes & 
Scharkow, 2013). If the 95% lower and upper CI limits did not include zero, we concluded 
that the mediated effect was different from zero.  
As depicted in the supplementary material, we ran a path analysis in which 
perspective taking (0 = objective, 1 = other-oriented), goal (0 = avoidance, 1 = 
confrontation), and their interaction terms were our exogenous independent variables. 
Explicit anger preference and anger utility belief were the mediators, and preference for 
anger-inducing stimuli was the final outcome. The effect of the interaction terms on both 
explicit anger preference (B = 3.49., S.E. = .49, p < .001) and anger utility belief (B = 3.33, 
S.E. = .58, p < .001) was statistically significant Accordingly, we probed the effects of 
perspective taking on explicit anger preference and anger utility belief across the two goal 
conditions. Simple slope analysis indicated that for the avoidance condition the 
unstandardized effect of perspective taking on explicit anger preference (B = -.29., S.E. = .41, 
p = .49) was not significant, but it was for anger utility belief (B = -1.09., S.E. = .47, p = .02). 
Furthermore, only the effect of explicit anger preference (B =.26., S.E. = .07, p < .001) but 
not anger utility belief (B =.06., S.E. = .06, p = .31) was significantly related to preference for 
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anger-inducing stimuli. Next, the mediation analysis indicated that neither explicit anger 
preference (ab = -.07, 95% CI [-.37, .11]) nor anger utility belief (ab = -.06, 95% CI [-
.29, .04]) significantly mediated the effect of perspective taking on preference for anger-
inducing stimuli.   
For confrontation, simple slope analyses indicated that perspective taking 
significantly predicted explicit anger preference (B = 3.21., S.E. = .28, p < .001;) and anger 
utility belief (B = 2.24., S.E. = .35, p < .001). Furthermore, only explicit anger preference (B 
= .26, S.E. = .07, p = .001) but not anger utility belief (B = .06, S.E. = .06, p = .35) predicted 
preference for anger-inducing stimuli. The mediation analysis showed that explicit anger 
preference mediated the effect of perspective taking on preference for anger-inducing stimuli 
(ab = .83, 95% CI [.36, 1.34]). Following Kline (2011), we conducted a further sensitivity 
analysis by constraining to the mediating paths to test whether the fit of the model was 
significantly different from the unconstrained one. Results showed that although the 
comparative fit index was good (i.e.,.97), the chi square of the constrained model showed a 
significant increase (χ2 = 9.03, df = 2, p = .01) thereby attesting to the implausibility of the 
constraints.   
For preference for fear-inducing stimuli, we entered as independent variables 
perspective taking, goal, and the interaction of both terms. Explicit fear preference and fear 
utility belief were entered as mediators, and preference for fear-inducing stimuli was the final 
outcome. The effects of the interaction terms were statistically significant on explicit fear 
preference (B = -3.55., S.E. = .55, p < .001) and fear utility belief (B = -2.96, S.E. = .62, p 
< .001). Accordingly, we probed the effects of perspective taking on explicit fear preference 
and fear utility belief across the two goal conditions. Simple slope analysis indicated that for 
the confrontation condition the unstandardized effect of perspective taking on explicit fear 
preference (B = -.32, S.E. = .39, p = .41) and on fear utility belief (B = .04, S.E. = .45, p 
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= .93) were not significant. In addition, neither explicit fear preference (B = .19, S.E. = .10, p 
= .06) nor fear utility belief (B = -.08, S.E. = .09, p = .41) were significantly related to 
preference for fear-inducing stimuli. The mediation analysis indicated that neither explicit 
fear preference (ab = -.06, 95%CI [-.34, .07]) nor fear utility belief (ab = -.003, 95%CI [-
.15, .10]) significantly mediated the effect of perspective taking on preference for fear-
inducing stimuli.   
For avoidance, results showed that perspective taking significantly predicted explicit 
fear preference (B = 3.23., S.E. = .38, p <.001) and fear utility belief (B = 3.00, S.E. = .40, p 
< .001). As for confrontation, neither explicit fear preference (B = .19, S.E. = .10, p = .06) 
nor fear utility belief (B = -.08, S.E. = .09, p = .41) predicted a preference for fear-inducing 
stimuli. The mediation analysis showed that explicit fear preference mediated the effect of 
perspective taking on preference for fear-inducing stimuli (ab = .62, 95% CI [.004, 1.28]), 
but not fear utility belief (ab = -.23, 95% CI [-.88, .31]). Following Kline (2011), we applied 
an equality constrain to the mediating paths to test whether the fit of the model was 
significantly worse. Results showed that the model did not have a worse fit, as the χ2 statistic 
was not significant (χ2 = 3.13, df = 2, p = .21). In the constrained model, the mediated path 
from perspective taking to preference for fear-inducing stimuli via explicit fear preference no 
longer significantly mediated the effect (ab = .62, 95% CI [.004, 1.28]). Likewise, fear utility 
belief was not a significant mediator (ab = .15, 95% CI [-.10, .42]).   
Taken, together, these findings suggest that in confrontation only explicit anger 
preference was a significant mediator. For fear, we did not find a significant effect of our 
mediators. Therefore, our data did not provide empirical support for the alternative account, 
that is, the results cannot be explained by participants having a better theory of mind.   
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Discussion 
Previous research has suggested that people may avoid making partners feel bad 
because such negative emotions are perceived as harmful (hedonic approach; Zaki & 
Williams, 2013). Alternatively, people may engage in interpersonal affect worsening to 
obtain a personal benefit (instrumental interpersonal affect worsening; Netzer et al., 2015). 
We showed that people may choose to be cruel to be kind. That is, agents may make a target 
feel bad to achieve a desired goal without the agents reaping any benefits themselves 
(altruistic affect worsening). Participants in the other-oriented perspective taking condition 
selected negative emotion-inducing stimuli that could benefit the target’s performance in a 
video game, supporting the empathy hypothesis. Furthermore, participants’ selection of 
stimuli was not random, as they wanted their partner to feel a specific negative emotion. One 
could argue that this is affect maintenance rather than worsening, given that the ostensible 
partner was initially described as being upset. However, affect maintenance seems an 
unlikely explanation. Although anger, fear, and upset are considered negative-valence 
emotions, they still differ in their levels of arousal (e.g., Feldman-Barrett, 2011).  
Finally, participants  perceived a particular negative stimulus to be more beneficial for 
succeeding in a particular game (supporting the beneficial goal hypothesis). Although one 
may argue that between-group differences in emotion utility belief indicated that participants 
in the other-oriented perspective taking condition were better at anticipating which emotion 
was more suitable for each goal (confrontation vs. avoidance), this alternative hypothesis was 
not supported. In two moderated mediation analyses only explicit emotion preferences were a 
significant mediator. Thus, participants were indeed cruel to be kind as they wanted the 
targets to experience a specific negative emotional response depending on the goal. 
Our results support the extensive research on altruism and empathy showing how 
people help others even when altruistic behaviours may not entail a personal benefit (Batson 
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et al., 1988). This study extends these findings by revealing, for the first time, that people 
who experience empathic concern not only employ behaviour to decrease others’ suffering 
but may also altruistically manipulate others’ negative affect if this increases the others’ long-
term well-being, supporting the altruistic motivation hypothesis. Participants’ efforts at 
worsening others’ affect may additionally be motivated by egoistic reasons such as looking 
for social recognition (Cialdini et al., 1987) or demand effects. However, these explanations 
are unlikely to explain the findings of the current study, as participants were made aware that 
their choices were completely anonymous. Moreover, if participants’ choices were driven by 
demand effects (i.e., participants selected stimuli similar to those they received), then similar 
patterns should have been obtained for participants in both perspective taking conditions. 
Finally, participants could have been motivated by restoring their own well-being (Hareli & 
Hess, 2010). While participants intentionally reduced their chances of receiving £50 by 
worsening their partner’s affect, this may constitute only a low-cost action. Future research 
should therefore consider a higher cost, such as volunteering time (e.g., Batson, 2011).   
The findings of our study pose a challenging question: What are the limits in affect 
worsening if it is for the sake of another’s well-being? It may be that an agent will initiate the 
affect worsening process for another’s well-being even if it is not necessary and even if the 
agent misperceives the other’s need to feel bad to achieve long-term well-being (Hareli & 
Hess, 2010). Investigating the boundary conditions for altruistically and egoistically 
motivated interpersonal affect worsening will provide more information about adults’ 
emotion–outcome expectancies regarding others’ emotions, the cost–benefit calculations, and 
the factors they may consider when inducing a negative emotion in another. Below, we 
suggest a number of possibilities that can be explored in future research to test the boundary 
conditions of altruistic affect worsening. 
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Making sure that participants were unknown to each other was an intentional design 
choice of this study to maximize internal validity. Yet, research has shown that people may 
be more motivated to change others’ affect in close relationships (Butler, 2011). To maximize 
external validity, future research could employ diary studies where people have to note 
information about the situation, the strategy, and the agent involved in the regulatory process 
(Parkinson & Simons, 2009). The use of video recording of dyads discussing real-life 
concerns or worries may also be helpful (Parkinson, Simons, & Niven, 2016). This line of 
research and the assessment of whether agents feel mixed emotions when engaging in affect 
worsening would clarify whether agents experience difficulties when worsening a target’s 
affect depending on how close they feel to the target.  
Other variables may impact agents’ responsiveness to a target’s emotions and goals. 
One of these variables may be empathic accuracy, the ability to optimally infer another’s 
internal states (Ickes, 1997). High levels of empathic concern may lead to high 
responsiveness to a target only when empathic accuracy is high (Winczewski, Bowen, & 
Collins, 2016). Another variable that may impact agents’ responsiveness is the perceptions of 
the target’s regulatory skills (Parkinson & Simons, 2012). In fact, the experimental procedure 
used in the present study depicted the ostensible partner as upset and without any hope of 
getting over a breakup in order to provoke an empathic emotional reaction in the participants, 
which may have affected the participants’ willingness to engage in affect worsening. Thus, 
future research could manipulate the agent’s perception of the target’s regulatory skills.  
In this study, participants did not have the option to induce positive emotions in the 
target. Thus, we were unable to test if participants who experienced higher empathic concern 
might have wanted to increase the other’s well-being by selecting positive emotion-inducing 
stimuli, as suggested by the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 2011). Future research 
may need to include happiness-inducing emotional stimuli to test this alternative hypothesis. 
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Furthermore, in our study and in the one by Netzer et al. (2015), participants could only 
worsen others’ affect by selecting or modifying the situation. However, other research has 
investigated other strategies that can be used to change others’ emotional states (e.g., co-
rumination; Parkinson & Simons, 2012), and future research may benefit by studying these 
strategies.  In sum, the present research opens an exciting research program that may enhance 
our knowledge of social cognition and interpersonal emotion regulation.  
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